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1. Why is the stock market tanking? 
 
As these lines are being written (April 2018), the U.S. stock market is again in turmoil. After a 
two-year bull run in which share prices soared by nearly 50 per cent, the market is suddenly 
dropping. Since the beginning of 2018, it lost nearly 10 per cent of its value, threatening 
investors with an official ‘correction’ or worse. 
 
As always, there is no shortage of explanations. Politically inclined analysts emphasize 
Trump’s recently announced trade wars, sprawling scandals and threatening investigations, 
as well as the broader turn toward ‘populism’; interest-rate forecasters point to central-bank 
tightening and china’s negative credit impulse; quants speak of breached support lines and 
death crosses; bottom-up analysts highlight the negative implications of the 
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica debacle for the ‘free-data’ business model; and top-down 
fundamentalists indicate that, at near-record valuations, the stock market is a giant bubble 
ready to be punctured. 
 
And on the face of it, these 
explanations all ring true. They 
articulate various threats to future 
profits, interest rates and risk 
perceptions, and since equity prices 
discount expected risk-adjusted future 
earnings, these threats imply lower 
prices.  
 
But there is one little problem. Unlike 
their pundits, capitalists nowadays 
tend to look not forward, but backward: 
instead of matching asset prices to the 
distant future, they fit them to the 
immediate past. 
 
 
 
[Illustration by Elvire Thouvenot-Nitzan elvirethouvenot.com]. [Link to gif:  
http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/534/1/20180400_with_their_back_to_the_future_wpcasp_animation.gif]  
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2. With their back to the future 
 
Judging by Figure 1, the main driver of U.S. stock prices is current earnings per share, or 
EPS.
2
 The chart contrasts Datastream monthly data for U.S. EPS and share prices since 
1995. The top panel plots the levels of the two variables, while the bottom panel shows their 
annual rates of change, and in both cases the temporal pattern leaves little doubt: share 
prices and current earnings are tightly correlated.  
 
Figure 1 U.S. Datastream Stock Prices and EPS, 1995-2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: EPS are computed as the ratio of stock prices and the price-earnings ratio. Annual rates of 
change are calculated relative to the same month in the previous year. The last data points are March 
2018 for price and January 2018 for EPS.   
Source: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKUS(PI) for price and TOTMKUS(PE) for earnings per share). 
 
 
Before we proceed, it is worth noting that ‘current’ earnings are not exactly current: the EPS 
for a given month are earned not during that month but up two years earlier. The reason is 
twofold. First, each EPS observation is a 12-month trailing average of previously reported 
earnings. And second, each of these previously reported earnings represents profits earned 
in the previous year. All in all, then, each EPS observation covers 12 to 24 months’ worth of 
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profits, so if stock prices are indeed driven by EPS, they are driven not by current profits, but 
by past ones. 
 
These considerations have two implications. The first and less important is that, contrary to 
popular belief, the recent market trajectory – i.e., its increase till December 2017 and its drop 
since February 2018 – has had little to do with President Trump’s impact on earnings, actual 
or alleged. As the chart shows, when Trump took office in January 2017, prices were already 
rising on the back of an EPS recovery that started in November 2015 (marked by the first 
vertical dotted line). EPS growth accelerated after Trump entered the White House, but since 
EPS data represent profits earned up to two years earlier, this acceleration could not have 
been influenced by Trump’s election, let alone his policies. Similarly with the 2018 price drop: 
as the figure shows, the February market decline came after EPS fell in January 2018 
(second vertical dotted line), and since most of the profits represented by January’s EPS were 
earned before Trump’s policies came into effect, they could not have been significantly 
influenced by those policies to start with.  
 
The second implication is broader and much more important. According to the data, present-
day capitalists seem to view the world much like the Aymara people of Southern Peru and 
Northern Chile do: with their back to the future. The Aymara language reverses the 
directional-temporal order of most other languages: it treats the known past as being ‘in front 
of us’ and the unknown future as lying ‘behind us’.
3
 And judging by the Pearson correlation 
coefficient recorded in the bottom panel, capitalists do the same: since 1995, a full 46 per 
cent of the (squared) variations in the rate of change of stock prices can be explained by 
variations in the rate of change of past earnings.  
 
This Aymara-like behaviour borders on sacrilege. In general, equity prices are thought of as 
determined by two types of factors – ‘fundamental’ (primarily earnings, risk and liquidity) and 
what we may call ‘deviational’ (including momentum, investors’ hype, technical omens and 
other occult forces and self-propelling prophecies that cause prices to diverge from their ‘true’ 
values). At any point in time, prices reflect the weighted average of both sets of factors. But 
there is broad agreement that, over the longer haul, the ‘fundamentals’ dominate. And the 
‘fundamentals’, by definition, are forward looking.  
 
According to finance textbooks, investors should look not backward, but forward. Their 
standard capitalization ritual, reiterated endlessly by the scientists of finance, conditions and 
compels them to discount not past profits, but future ones. Moreover, since corporations – 
and the capitalist system more generally – have no ‘expiry date’, their owners should look far 
beyond their immediate horizons. To properly price their assets, they must discount the profits 
they expect to earn not in the next few quarters or even several years, but all the way to 
‘eternity’ (Benjamin Graham, quoted in Zweig 2009: 28). 
 
But if so, why do present-day capitalists defy their most sacred ritual and, instead of peering 
into deep future, remain fixated on the immediate past? 
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3. The radical inversion 
 
To complicate things further, according to Figure 2 (also based on Datastream) this 
backward-looking posture is in fact rather new. As the bottom panel shows, until 1995 the 
cyclical growth rates of stock prices and EPS moved not together, but inversely: whereas the 
Pearson correlation between these rates was +0.46 in the post-1995 period, in the pre-1995 
era it was –0.58. In other words, whatever affected the growth rate of stock prices from 1973 
to 1995, it was not the growth rate of recent profits. 
 
This radical inversion is highly perplexing. Why would capitalists obey their rituals in one 
period only to ignore it in the next? What happened in the mid-1990s that made them shift 
from forward- to backward-looking asset pricing? What does this shift mean for the broader 
logic of capital accumulation? And what does it imply for the near future? 
 
Figure 2 U.S. Datastream Stock Prices and EPS, 1973-1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: EPS are computed as the ratio of stock prices and the price-earnings ratio. Annual rates of 
change are calculated relative to the same month in the previous year. The last data points are for 
December 1994.   
Source: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKUS(PI) for price and TOTMKUS(PE) for earnings per share). 
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4. Systemic fear: the power of denial 
 
In our RWER paper ‘A CasP Model of the Stock Market’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2016), we argued 
that the extent to which capitalists look backward rather than forward is indicative of their 
‘systemic fear’ – namely, their apprehension for the very future of capitalism.
4
 
 
Since capitalization is forward-looking, variations in current profits should have no more than 
a negligible impact on asset prices, and variations in past profits should have no impact at all. 
Exclusive reliance on the future attests the capitalists’ systemic confidence. It demonstrates 
their belief that earnings will continue to flow and that assets will always have buyers – in 
other words, that their current system is eternal, and that the ritual of capitalization will 
dominate the world forever.  
 
Now imagine the opposite situation – a setting in which capitalists lose this systemic 
confidence in the future and are instead struck by systemic fear, the apprehension that the 
current mode of power might crumble. Interestingly, the capitalists’ immediate reaction to 
systemic fear is not capitulation, but denial: ‘What? We worry? Fear for our system? No way!’ 
To sustain this denial and retain a semblance of confidence, though, capitalists need proof; 
they need evidence that they are still in driver’s seat, and the most readily available evidence 
of such control is their EPS here and now (read in the most recent past). If EPS remain high – 
or better still, if they continue to rise – then we, the capitalists, can remain hopeful despite the 
threatening future. And if our group as a whole stays hopeful, then, as individual investors, we 
have good reason to hold on to and even augment our equity holdings. 
 
Paradoxically, then, the evidence for systemic fear lies in its very denial. We can know that 
capitalists have been struck by systemic fear by the fact that they effectively negate and 
abandon their core ritual of forward-looking capitalization; and we can measure the degree to 
which they negate this ritual by the extent to which their asset pricing comes to depend on 
past or current earnings rather than future earnings. This power of denial underpins our 
systemic fear index. 
 
 
5. The systemic fear index 
 
The systemic fear index measures the short-term correlation between stock prices and EPS. 
The higher this correlation, we argue, the greater the reliance of equity pricing on current and 
past earnings and, by implication, the more fearful capitalists are for their system’s future.  
 
Figure 3 shows the construction of this index.
5
  The top panel shows monthly price and EPS 
data for the S&P 500 group of companies, dating back to 1871. The bottom panel plots short-
term correlations. The thin series in the bottom panel measures the 12-month trailing 
correlation between the price and EPS series shown in the top panel. Each observation 
shows the correlation over the past year, with a value ranging between –1 (perfect inverse 
correlation) and +1 (perfect direct co-movement).
6
  
 
                                                          
4
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5
 For a detail explanation and comparison with earlier formulations, see Bichler and Nitzan (2016: 
Section 6). 
6
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The difficulty with the thin 12-month trailing correlation is that it oscillates widely, so visual 
inspection alone is not very revealing here. The thick series in the bottom panel addresses 
this difficulty by smoothing the thin series as a ten-year trailing average. Each observation in 
the thick series measures the average 12-month trailing correlation between price and EPS 
over the previous ten years.
7
 We call this series the systemic fear index. 
 
Figure 3 The S&P 500 Price and EPS: The Systemic Fear Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The S&P 500 index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and 
railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s 
Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The 
12-month trailing correlation in the bottom panel (thin series) measures the correlation between price 
and earnings per share (EPS). The 10-year trailing average (thick series) is the mean of this trailing 
correlation over the past 120 months. The last data points are September 2017 for EPS and March 2018 
for price. 
Source: S&P 500 price and EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s online data archives 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on March 30, 2018).  
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6. The evolution of systemic fear 
 
Figure 4 enlarges our systemic fear index taken from the bottom panel of Figure 3, making it 
easier to examine. The chart shows two clear patterns: one long term, the other shorter term. 
The long-term pattern has a V-shape, with the early 1990s as its low point. Until the early 
1920s, forward-looking capitalization was still in its infancy, so the correlation between price 
and EPS was pretty high, hovering around +0.4.
8
 But even then, there was already a visible 
down drift, and by the 1940s this down drift had turned into a sharp decline. Discounting 
methods were now making their way into introductory textbooks, and by the 1950s, with the 
capitalization ritual becoming more widely accepted and increasingly internalized by equity 
investors, the correlation fell to around zero. For the next half century, the index hovered 
around this value – albeit with some significant oscillations (the lack of correlation during this 
period is evident in the bottom panel of Figure 2).  
 
Figure 4 The Systemic Fear Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note & Source: Bottom panel of Figure 3. The last data point is for September 2017. 
 
And then came a decisive upward reversal. It started in the mid-1990s, and initially the uptick 
looked like part of yet another short oscillation. But by the early 2000s it became evident (at 
least in retrospect) that the century-long downtrend had been broken. Instead of reverting 
back to zero, the systemic fear index continued to soar and, by the early 2010s, reached an 
all-time high of +0.6 (the tightening correlation during this period is evident in Figure 1). 
 
This V-shape pattern, though, has been anything but smooth. Oscillating around the long-
term down- and uptrends are plenty of shorter-term fluctuations, some of which are pretty 
pronounced. So the question we need to address is what lies behind these patterns: what 
determines the long-term V-shape of the index and what accounts for its shorter-term 
fluctuations?  
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7. Short-termism: culture or power? 
 
At stake here is the connection between the two key quantities of the capitalist nomos – the 
price of capital and its underlying earnings – so the question is obviously important.
9
 Yet, to 
the best of our knowledge, that question has never been asked, let alone answered. Indeed, 
as far as we know, the V-shape pattern of the short-term price-EPS correlation shown in 
Figures 3 and 4 is a new finding.  
 
It is common to argue that, since the 1980s, U.S. capitalism has been marked by a growing 
emphasis on ‘shareholder value’, heightened ‘short-termism’ and a nearly universal obsession 
with quarterly increases in profits. This popular view is certainly consistent with the post-
1980s surge of the price-EPS correlation shown in Figure 4 – and this consistency should 
hardly surprise us. With capitalists paying more and more attention to the latest bottom line 
and analysts glued to the latest bit of news, it is no wonder that equity markets have become 
increasingly sensitive to the most recent variations in earnings.
10
  
 
But what is the cause of these changes? Why has the capitalist time horizon shrunk? Why 
have investors – who, for a whole century up until that point, cared less and less about 
current earnings and often seemed perfectly happy to buy and hold stocks for the long haul – 
suddenly started to insist on quarterly increases in profits? Is the V-shape reversal of the early 
1990s merely the consequence of a changing ‘investment culture’? Is it simply a new fad 
imprinted by the theoretical winds of just-in-time neoliberalism and emboldened by the 
ideological flare of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Alan Greenspan – or are these 
developments themselves the result of a deeper change?  
 
The evidence presented below suggests the latter. Present-day capitalists and analysts, we 
argue, have come to demand quarterly increases in profits not because they started to ‘feel 
like it’, because they were taken over by a new financial ‘fashion’ or because they were 
somehow convinced that short-term increases are more ‘economically efficient’ than long-
term growth. In our view, they do so because they are compelled to, and the force that 
compels them has nothing to do with any of the above. The reason, rather, is that their 
capitalized power is approaching its asymptotes, and the only way for them to counteract their 
deepening systemic fear is by pushing for higher current earnings.
11
  
 
 
8. Capitalized power and systemic fear 
 
In ‘A CasP Model of the Stock Market’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2016), we developed a capitalized 
power index, defined as the ratio of the S&P 500 price index and the average wage rate. The 
numerator and denominator of our power index represent a conflict: the clash between those 
who own the capitalized means of power and those who are controlled by them.  
 
Note that we use the average wage rate here not as a measure of productivity or wellbeing, 
but as a benchmark against which to gauge the differential power of owners. Furthermore, 
                                                          
9
 The word ‘nomos’ was used by the ancient Greeks to denote the broader social–legal–historical 
institutions of society (Castoriadis 1984, 1991). The capitalist nomos is explored in Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009: Ch. 9). 
10
 This point was raised by Suhail Malik at the 2016 CasP conference presentation of this paper 
(http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/489/).  
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although strictly speaking the wage rate pertains only to employed workers, its temporal 
movement approximates, however crudely, the changing conditions of the underlying 
population at large. Thus, when our power index rises, this means that the power of equity 
owners relative to the underlying population increases – and vice versa when the index falls. 
Moreover, and importantly, this relative power is forward looking: it denotes not only the 
rulers’ relative position here and now, but also how they expect this relative position to 
change in the future.  
 
Figure 5 The Dialectic of Power and Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The systemic fear index represents annual averages of the monthly series shown in Figure 4. The 
S&P 500 price splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock 
series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite 
(1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The wage rate 
splices hourly data for manufacturing production workers till 1946 with hourly data for nonfarm business-
sector workers from 1947 onward. The last data points are 2016 for the systemic fear index and 2017 
for the power index. 
Source: Annual S&P 500 price is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series code: _SPXD) and 
from Global Insight (GI) from 1901 onward (series code: JS&PNS). The hourly wage rate splices the 
following series: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online: hourly wages in 
manufacturing, all trades, 1865-1889 (series code: Ba4290), hourly earnings in manufacturing, all 
industries, 1890-1913 (series code: Ba4299), weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing, 
1914-1918 (series code: Ba4362), hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing, 1919-1938 
(series code: Ba4361); Global Insight (GI): average hourly earnings of production workers in 
manufacturing, 1939-1946 (series code: AHPMFNS); Conference Board through GI: average hourly 
compensation of all employees in the nonfarm business sector (series code: JRWSSNFE). Monthly S&P 
500 price and EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s online data archives  
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on March 30, 2017).  
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Now, as Figure 5 indicates – and here we come to the crucial point – our power and systemic 
fear indices seem to move in tandem. The dotted blue series, plotted against the right scale, 
is our systemic fear index, taken from Figure 4 (to reiterate, this index is the ten-year trailing 
average of the 12-month trailing correlation between the S&P 500 price and EPS). The solid 
black series, plotted against the left log scale, is our power index, smoothed as a ten-year 
trailing average to match the periodicity of the systemic fear index. And as the data show, the 
correlation between them is very tight: its Pearson coefficient for the past 134 years is +0.84 
out of a maximum of +1.  
 
What this correlation tells us is that the greater the capitalized power of equity owners relative 
to the underlying population, the greater their systemic fear and therefore the greater their 
reliance on current earnings when pricing their stocks – and conversely, the lesser their 
capitalized power, the lower their systemic fear and hence the weaker their emphasis on 
present profits. 
 
 
9. The dialectic of power and fear 
 
At first sight, this co-movement might seem counterintuitive. Why should capitalists fear more 
for their system as they grow more powerful? Shouldn’t it be the other way around – i.e., the 
greater their power, the lesser their systemic fear?  
 
To answer this question, we need to backtrack a bit. Power is a complex and often slippery 
concept. It has numerous dimensions and layers, it is historically contingent and context-
dependent and, most importantly, it is deeply dialectical and self-transformative. In our own 
research, we extend Johannes Kepler’s scientific notion of force to view capitalized power not 
as a stand-alone qualitative entity, but as a quantitative relationship between entities (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2014: 141). Here, we define this power very broadly as the relationship between 
equity owners and the underlying population, quantified by the ratio of stock prices to the 
wage rate. But we also argue that the quantity of capitalized power expresses the rulers’ 
confidence in the obedience of the ruled (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 17) – which in our case 
here denotes the confidence of equity owners in the obedience of the underlying population.  
 
Confidence in obedience, though, is not a monolithic sentiment. If we are to generalize, we 
might say that the buildup of power generates not one, but two movements – one extroverted, 
the other introverted – and that the trajectories of these two movements are not similar but 
opposite. On the outside, the relationship appears positive: the greater the rulers’ power, the 
greater their display of confidence in obedience. But on the inside, the connection is negative: 
the more powerful the rulers, the greater their fear that their power might crumble.  
 
This double-sided relationship is the linchpin of Hobbes’ Leviathan (1691). The relatively 
equal abilities of human beings, he says, breed their uncertainty, insecurity and mutual 
suspicion, and these forces in turn compel them to try to increase their differential power 
without end. But, then – and this is the crucial qualifier – the more power one possesses, the 
more he or she dreads losing it all. The result is an ongoing cycle, with fear stoking a hunger 
for power, and the amassment of power heightening the very fear that begot that hunger in 
the first place (for example, pp. 75 and 94).  
 
Now consider how this double movement unfolds in our case here. Capitalists, we posit, are 
driven to increase their capitalized power without end, and this increase, we maintain, boosts 
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their expressed confidence in obedience. And how do we know that their confidence in 
obedience is indeed rising? Because the stock prices comprising the numerator of the power 
index are determined by the capitalists themselves, and because capitalists determine those 
prices by risking the thing they cherish the most: their own money. Indeed, the only reason for 
capitalists to buy stocks and in so doing bid up the stock price/wage ratio is that they expect 
this ratio to rise even further. And the fact that they believe that this ratio will go up attests to 
their confidence in obedience – the confidence that the underlying population will not 
expropriate them and that the system as a whole will not fail them. In this sense, our power 
index offers an objective measure of capitalist confidence – at least on the outside.  
 
But as Figure 5 shows, there is another, inner process at work here: the temporal basis for 
capitalist confidence in obedience varies with the level of capitalized power. When the power 
index is low, the projected confidence of capitalists is inherently forward-looking. During such 
periods – for example, the 1940s or the 1980s – capitalists focus on the future and ignore 
present profits altogether (as indicated by the low, zero or even negative price-EPS 
correlation). And why? Because the lower the capitalized power, the greater the scope for 
increasing it further. 
 
In our earlier work (Bichler and Nitzan 2006; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Ch. 11), we developed 
the notion of the ‘elementary particles’ of capitalization – future earnings and investors’ hype 
in the numerator of the capitalization formula, and risk and the normal rate of return in the 
denominator:  
 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 × ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 × 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
 
 
When the power index is low – as it was, for instance, during the 1940s and 1950s and, 
again, during 1980s – the elementary particles of capitalization can be augmented/reduced to 
boost it further: income can be further redistributed in favour of profits; investors’ hype can be 
further amplified; profit volatility and therefore risk perceptions can be further decreased; and 
the normal rate of return can be further lowered. And as long as the potential for further 
augmentation/reduction in favour of capital remains large, equity owners can safely ignore the 
dismal present and capitalize the promising future.
12
 
 
However, when the power index is high – as it was, for example, during the early twentieth 
century, and as it is now, at the beginning of the twenty-first – confidence in obedience must 
rely largely on the present (and it does, as shown by the high price-EPS correlation during 
these periods). And why? Because capitalized power is not unbounded. The greater the 
power, the greater the resistance to power. And when power approaches its asymptotes – in 
this case, when the profit share of income and the level of hype are already high and income 
volatility and the normal rate of return already low – increasing it further within the existing 
confines of the ‘symbolic machine’, as Ulf Martin (2010, 2018) calls it, becomes harder and 
harder (Bichler and Nitzan 2012). Such increases require further threat, sabotage and open 
force, which in turn make the system ever more complex and increasingly brittle, and hence 
prone to breakdown (Bichler and Nitzan 2010). Under these circumstances, the only way for 
capitalists to retain their apparent confidence is to be constantly reassured that the system 
                                                          
12
 On the elementary particles of capitalization, see Nitzan and Bichler (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Ch. 
11). 
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still holds here and now. And since the future is too bleak to rely on, this reassurance can 
come only from current profits. 
 
 
10. The omen 
 
Rulers always need an omen, a self-serving looking glass to bolster their confidence and 
galvanize their resolve. But sometimes the omen refuses to cooperate, and when it disobeys, 
the façade crumbles and the rulers find themselves facing the void. Literature offers many 
illustrious examples: the evil queen in the Brothers Grimm’s Little Snow-White, whose 
obedient magic mirror suddenly defies her, declaring that she is not the fairest of all; Genghis 
Khan in Aitmatov’s The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years (1983), whose loyal guiding 
cloud suddenly disappears, leaving the Khan’s globetrotting conquest in tatters; Belshazzar, 
the omnipotent king of Babylon, whose hubris is suddenly deflated by a mysterious writing on 
the wall (Book of Daniel: Ch. 5); the list goes on.  
 
These power mirrors, though, are pretty naïve. They typically generate no more than a binary 
image, and their warnings almost always come too late. By contrast, the stock price-EPS 
correlation offers an infinitely nuanced reflection. Instead of a binary image, it draws a 
continuous scale, ranging from a Pearson coefficient of 0 (or less), which indicates that 
forward-looking capitalists do not fear for their system, to a Pearson coefficient of +1, which 
means that capitalists, struck by systemic fear, have completely abandoned their core belief 
in forward-looking capitalization in favour of a defensive, backward-looking posture.  
 
This analytical range is shown historically in Figure 6. The chart presents the same data 
series from Figure 5, but instead of displaying them on a time scale, it plots them against one 
another. Each annual observation projects two readings: the ten-year trailing average of the 
power index on the horizontal scale, and the systemic fear index on the vertical scale. The 
observations are tightly clustered around a positive slope, reconfirming what we have already 
seen in Figure 5 – namely, that capitalized power is closely intertwined with systemic fear. For 
illustration purposes, we use a dashed red line to trace the evolution of this temporal 
relationship during the most recent period: from 1983, when the systemic fear index was at a 
record low, to 2014, when it reached its all-time high. 
 
The gradual temporal ‘stretching’ of this dashed line has been akin to pulling a string: as the 
United States moved up and to the right on this path, the tension between sabotage and 
resistance kept rising and rising. However, because the process has been so slow and drawn 
out, initially this buildup was largely imperceptible. Indeed, until recently the key ‘actors’ 
themselves – i.e., the capitalists and fund managers, along with policymakers and opinion 
shapers – remained largely unware of it and seldom admitted it, not even to themselves (and 
rarely if ever in the manner described here). But as Thorstein Veblen might have put it, 
although they are yet to recognize it with their mind, they already know it in their heart. And 
here their actions speak louder than words: with their power rising, they have gradually but 
systematically abandoned their sacred ritual of forward-looking capitalization in favour of the 
still-rosy present. Their current mode of power is becoming increasingly unstable, and their 
short-term equity pricing indicates that underneath the hubris lies a deepening apprehension 
that it might not last.  
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Figure 6 The Dialectic of Power and Fear, 1882-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note & Source: See Figure 5. 
 
 
Our own study of redistribution as the key power axis of capitalism started during the early 
1980s. At the time, U.S. capitalized power and systemic fear were at all-time lows, investors 
were totally oblivious to the issue and our work was typically classified as ‘social economics’ 
(with an aftertaste of moralizing ‘social justice’). But as capitalized power and systemic fear 
increased, the crucial importance of redistribution slowly percolated to the surface, and in 
2014, when power and fear reached record highs, Thomas Piketty’s work on inequality 
(Piketty 2014) was suddenly made top news and everyone suddenly knew (all along) that the 
top 1 per cent held the rest of the world under its thumb.  
 
And then the discourse started to change. Although the talking heads still hail capitalism as 
the best of all possible worlds, by the mid-2010s we started to see more and more 
expressions of guilt (the IMF admitting that the project of neoliberal globalization has been 
'oversold'; Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri 2016), remorse (McKinsey cautioning that the current 
generation is poorer than its parents; McKinsey & Company et al. 2016), doubts about the 
ability of ‘economics’ to remain sheltered from ‘politics’ (hedge-fund billionare Ray Dalio 
predicting that from now on 'populism' will shape economic conditions more than 'classic 
monetary and fiscal policies'; Dalio et al. 2017) and dire warnings about the very future of the 
capitalism (former bond king Bill Gross alerting his fellow capitalists that, although ‘I’m an 
investor that ultimately does believe in the system’, I believe that ‘the system itself is at risk’; 
Gittelsohn 2016). With U.S. redistributional tensions remaining at an all-time high, many 
savvy investors sense that sooner or later the spring will snap, and as confidence crumbles 
and the rulers run for the stock-market doors, a new major bear market (MBM) will get under 
way.
13
   
                                                          
13
 For the genesis, earlier versions and prior analyses of the MBM concept, see Bichler and Nitzan 
(2008), Kliman, Bichler and Nitzan (2011), Bichler and Nitzan (2012) and Bichler and Nitzan (2016). 
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11. The cunning of history: will past earnings trigger the next crisis?  
 
If current market jitters develop into an MBM, the consequences are likely to be dramatic. 
Over the past two centuries, the United States has experienced seven MBMs with an average 
market drop of 57 per cent in constant dollars (Bichler and Nitzan 2016: Table 1, p. 122). 
Current U.S. market capitalization is almost $30 trillion, so a ‘typical’ MBM could end up 
wiping out $17-trillion worth of capitalist assets. And that is just for starters.  
 
During the past century, every MBM has been followed by a major creordering of capitalized 
power and a significant rewriting of the capitalist nomos.
14
 Thus, the MBM of 1905-1920 was 
followed by the rise of corporate capitalism; the MBM of 1928-1948 was followed by the rise 
of the Keynesian welfare-warfare state; and the MBM of 1968-1981 was followed by the rise 
of global neoliberalism. The consequences of first MBM of the twenty-first century, from 1999 
to 2008, are still hard to pin down, but one them seems to be a gradual shift toward a harsher 
mode of power – perhaps along the lines of Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1907). For this 
authoritarian shift to gain traction, though, capitalism might have to experience another MBM, 
hence the crucial important of the current moment.  
 
If our analysis here is correct, it follows that the very future of capitalism is now at stake. Yet, 
paradoxically, the recent history of the stock market cunningly suggests that this future now 
hinges on the trajectory of... past profits. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the two down legs of the most recent MBM – in 2000-2003 and then in 
2007-2008 – were both triggered by and/or coincided with a significant decline in earnings. 
Now, since both downturns began when the power and systemic fear indices were extremely 
high (Figure 5), this co-movement is exactly what our model predicts. And ominously, the 
present situation is practically the same: just like in the runup to the two previous downturns, 
the power and systemic fear indices are extremely high; and as before, these high levels 
mean that investors, standing with their back to the future, remain extremely sensitive to the 
direction of current earnings.  
 
So which way will earnings go?  
 
In our opinion, the more likely direction is down, and, prosaically, the main reason is timing. 
For corporate earnings to continue to rise, there must be further upward income redistribution 
– from the underlying population to capitalists. Now, as noted, given that the U.S. capitalist 
share of income and personal income inequality are already at record levels, this 
redistribution is likely to require a much more authoritarian mode of power; and as the 2017 
U.S. election of Donald Trump and the so-called ‘populist turn’ around the world suggest, the 
push in that direction might already be underway. However, even if a harsher mode of power 
were to emerge – and at this point, it is hard to say whether it will – this emergence will take 
time and its impact on EPS will register only with a considerable lag. 
 
And it is here that timing becomes critical. Standing with their back to the future and their eyes 
staring at the most recent past, U.S. capitalists remain extremely sensitive to even a small 
drop in earnings, and the cyclical backdrop they are currently looking at is highly 
unfavourable. The present U.S. expansion is already the second longest in history, interest 
                                                          
14
 The verb-noun ‘creorder’ fuses the dynamic and static aspects of creating order (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009, especially Ch. 14). 
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rates are already at historic lows and the profit share of GDP is still near record highs. If any 
one of these magnitudes reverts to its historic mean, EPS are likely to drop; if they all revert in 
tandem, the drop will surely be steep; and with the fear index at record highs, a significant 
earnings drop is almost certain to trigger a new MBM.  
 
Either threat – a longer-term Iron Heel-like trajectory or a more immediate MBM – spells 
social turmoil. And sadly, progressive forces in the U.S. and elsewhere seem prepared for 
neither. 
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